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Logical empiricism is commonly seen as a counter-position to scientific realism. In the pre-
sent paper it is shown that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist 
movement. In particular, I shall point out that at least four types of realistic arguments can be 
distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s ‘pragmatic 
argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’ All 
these variations of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from the 
shortcomings of radical positivism, instrumentalism, and other forms of scientific antirealism. 
On the whole, it will be seen that logical empiricism and scientific realism are essentially 
compatible with each other. Especially Kaila’s invariantist approach to science (and nature) 
comes quite close to what nowadays is discussed under the label ‘structural realism.’ This, in 
turn, necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of Kaila’s role in the logical empiricist move-
ment in particular and in twentieth-century philosophy of science in general.  
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1  Introduction 
Logical Empiricism has for a long time been conceived of as a monolithic, one-dimensional, 
movement within early twentieth-century philosophy. As such, it frequently served as a con-
trast for later, opposing viewpoints, such as scientific realism, critical rationalism, or Kuhnian 
historical relativism. However, as more recent research has revealed, logical empiricism was 
much more multifaceted than commonly assumed. Especially the seminal contributions by 
Michael Friedman (1999), Friedrich Stadler (2001), and Thomas Uebel (2007) strongly indi-
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cate that the assumption of the existence of varieties of logical empiricism is clearly closer to 
the truth than the view of it as a narrow, quasi-dogmatic ‘school.’ 
As concerns the debate over scientific realism, appraisals like the following, suggesting a 
strong incompatibility between scientific realism and logical empiricism, are still quite wide-
spread: 
 
The philosophy of science in the twentieth century has been a battlefield between ‘realist’ and 
‘anti-realist’ approaches. The interpretation of scientific theories, and the dispute about the 
cognitive significance of their theoretical terms and claims, provided a major impetus for the 
work of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s. The demise of logical positivism was followed by the 
rise of scientific realism within the analytic philosophy of science in the 1950s […]. (Ni-
iniluoto 1996, p. v) 
 
There is little doubt that scientific realism became the dominant position in the philosophy of 
science in the second half of the twentieth century. And it cannot be denied that logical empir-
icism began to lose momentum. However, it must be seen that the logical empiricist program 
– at least in some of its guises – was not so different from the scientific realist account of sci-
ence and nature. To be sure, there was a strong rejection of any form of metaphysical realism. 
But with respect to empirical science, most of the logical empiricists regarded realism not as a 
particularly contentious issue. Rather, they attempted to argue for the case of realism. More 
precisely, four kinds of arguments can be distinguished in this connection: a ‘probabilistic 
argument,’ a ‘pragmatic argument,’ an ‘indispensability argument,’ and an ‘invariantist argu-
ment.’ Given the variety of arguments, it is plausible to assume that logical empiricism and 
scientific realism are essentially compatible with each other.  
It is the aim of the following considerations to clarify and fortify this compatibilist idea of 
‘realistic claims in logical empiricism.’ I will attempt to make clear that the logical empiricists 
from the very beginning were rather open-minded toward an empirical, non-speculative, un-
derstanding of realism (Section 2). My goal is to demonstrate that this sort of programmatic 
open-mindedness developed into a (more or less) sophisticated commitment to the scientific 
realist agenda (Section 3) and that one specific articulation of ‘realistic claims in logical em-
piricism,’ namely the one delivered by Eino Kaila, comes close to current ‘structural’ realism 
(Section 4). By way of conclusion, it will be suggested that Kaila’s (invariantist) approach 
gives rise to the establishment of an autonomous, measurement-based, account of structural 




2  The Realism Issue: A Mere Pseudo-Problem? 
To help clarify the idea of ‘realistic claims in logical empiricism,’ it is reasonable to begin 
with what might be called the ‘received view’ of the logical empiricist approach toward the 
realism issue. According to this received view, the realism issue is nothing but a pseudo-
problem. And indeed: By examining the relevant writings of the relevant authors, one pretty 
soon discovers that the received view can easily be corroborated. Thus, for example, Rudolf 
Carnap, in his Pseudoproblems in Philosophy from 1928, explicitly states: “In the realism 
controversy, science can take neither an affirmative nor a negative position since the question 
has no meaning.” (Carnap [1928a] 1968, p. 333) Quite similarly, Moritz Schlick, in his 1932 
essay “Positivism and Realism,” argued that realism has no place in science because “the 
‘problem of the reality of the external world’ is a meaningless pseudo-problem” (Schlick 
[1932] 1979, p. 263). Thus, both Carnap and Schlick banished the realism issue from the field 
of meaningful questions. 
However, one must be careful to not overgeneralize this estimation. To be sure, the char-
acterization of the realism issue as a pseudo-problem forms one of the building blocks of the 
logical empiricist critique of metaphysics (see Friedman 2007 and Creath 2014). Yet it must 
be taken into account that both Carnap and Schlick, while rejecting metaphysical realism, 
emphatically argued for a non-speculative, empirical, realism. More precisely, both Carnap 
and Schlick thought of the outer-world hypothesis (the hypothesis of objects existing inde-
pendently of our consciousness) as meaningless. At the same time, though, they welcomed a 
realistic interpretation of the empirical statements of science. Thus, Carnap, in his The Logical 
Structure of the World (first published in 1928), points out: 
 
The realistic language, which the empirical sciences generally use, and the constructional 
language have actually the same meaning: they are both neutral as far as the decision of the 
metaphysical problem of reality between realism and idealism is concerned. It must be admit-
ted that, in practice, linguistic realism [sprachlicher Realismus], which is very useful in the 
empirical sciences, is frequently extended to a metaphysical realism; but this is a transgres-
sion of the boundaries of science […]. (Carnap [1928b] 1968, pp. 86-87) 
 
In a similar vein, Schlick in “Positivism and Realism” argued that positivism and realism are 
“not opposed” ([1932] 1979, p. 283) as long as the limits of experience are not transgressed. 
He even went so far as to contend that anyone who acknowledges the logical empiricist veri-
fication principle “must actually be an empirical realist” (ibid.).      
4 
 
Given these qualifications, it remains a large1y open question what exactly was implied 
by the sort of empirical realism proposed by Carnap and Schlick. Certainly, for Schlick, em-
pirical realism has to be understood in Kantian terms (see Schlick [1932] 1979, Sect. III). 
However, according to Kant himself, empirical realism is dependent on transcendental ideal-
ism and thus quite far away from both scientific realism and logical empiricism (see in this 
regard also Neuber 2014). Be that as it may, the important point to notice is that neither Car-
nap nor Schlick rejected realism unreservedly. Their rejection was confined to metaphysical 
realism, leaving enough space for accepting the raison d’être of a realistic interpretation of 
the language of science.  
 
3  Realism as a Problem of Language 
The work of spelling out this sort of interpretation, though, was left to others. The first one to 
be mentioned in this connection is Hans Reichenbach who, in his seminal Experience and 
Prediction from 1938, elaborated on the idea that the language of science be interpreted in 
realistic terms. Reichenbach’s frame for designing such a scientific realist account was the 
theory of meaning, i.e., semantics. What he proposed was a “probability theory of meaning” 
(see Reichenbach 1938, § 7), which he thought was strong enough to incorporate a semantics 
for theoretical terms, such as ‘atom,’ ‘electromagnetic field,’ etc. (see ibid., § 25)        
Reichenbach’s conception has been subject of extended investigation by various scholars 
(see, for example, Salmon 1999a, Putnam 2001, Psillos 2011a, Sober 2011). The crucial point 
in this conception is the assumption of a surplus meaning of theoretical terms. That is, in 
Reichenbach’s view the meaning of theoretical terms is not exhausted by their being reducible 
to an observational evidence base. Rather, they are invested with an autonomous dimension of 
explanatory impact, which, Reichenbach maintained, could be elegantly captured by a proba-
bilistic theory of inductive inference. More precisely, Reichenbach – in the context of his fa-
mous ‘cubical world’ analogy (see Reichenbach 1938, § 14) – pointed out that the existence 
of theoretical (‘unobservable’) entities can be inferred inductively by searching for the causes 
of (regularly occurring) observable effects (like, for example, the tracks in a Wilson cloud 
chamber). The inferred entities, which Reichenbach called “illata” (see ibid., p. 212), had the 
status of independently existing things, and their relation to immediately observable entities – 
Reichenbach called them “concreta” (ibid.) – was that of a “probability connection.” Or, as 




Since all observable qualities of the macroscopic bodies are only averages of qualities of the 
atoms, there are no strict inferences from the macroscopic bodies to the atom but only proba-
bility inferences; we have, therefore, no equivalence between statements about the macro-
scopic body and statements about the atoms but only a probability connection. (ibid., p. 216)   
         
All of this suggests a strong commitment to the scientific realist agenda. Relying on the 
specification of the basic scientific realist theses, as it has been provided by Stathis Psillos in 
his Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (see Psillos 1999, pp. xix-xxi), Reichen-
bach’s position might be summarized as follows: On the ontological level, the independent 
existence of theoretical entities (such as atoms) is assumed; on the semantic level, we have a 
theory of meaning for theoretical terms, namely the probability theory of meaning; on the 
epistemological level, it is assumed that theoretical entities (and their causal properties) are 
inductively accessible. In short, Reichenbach endorsed all of the central features of modern 
scientific realism.     
However, there are problems lurking in the background. The most obvious of these prob-
lems has to do with Reichenbach’s interpretation of probability. As is well known, Reichen-
bach in Experience and Prediction defended a frequency interpretation of probability (see 
Reichenbach 1938, §§ 32 and 38). Yet it is by no means clear how by invoking frequencies of 
observable events (‘objective probabilities’) the inference to unobservable entities like atoms 
could be justified. Reichenbach’s logical empiricist fellow Herbert Feigl made exactly this 
point, arguing that    
 
[t]he crux of the problem lies in the justification of applying the concept of inductive proba-
bility to the inference from the directly verifiable to directly unverifiable assertions. Any 
straightforward frequency interpretation of probability could serve here only if the success 
frequencies of such inferences were ascertainable. This is outright impossible if independent 
access to the “Illata” is barred. […] [T]he legitimacy of applying the probability concept to 
the whole realistic frame, instead of merely to inferences within it, remains painfully ques-
tionable. (Feigl 1950a, p. 53) 
 
The same objection had already been raised by Ernest Nagel (see Nagel 1938, p. 271 and 
Nagel 1939, p. 237-38). It essentially amounts to the observation that the realistic framework 
must already be in place in order to make inductive inferences to unobservable entities work. 
Accordingly, Reichenbach’s probability theory of meaning “requires the realist framework 
and cannot be a proof of it” (Psillos 2011a, p. 37).  
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This is, however, not the proper forum to examine how Reichenbach’s argument for sci-
entific realism could be improved by modifying his account of probability (for an interesting 
attempt, see Sober 2011). Nor is it my concern to dwell on Reichenbach’s later work and on 
his famous “principle of the common cause” (see in this connection Reichenbach 1956 and 
the reconstruction in Salmon 2005, pp. 24-25). What should be kept in mind, however, is that 
the ‘probabilistic argument’ brought forward in Experience and Prediction should be seen as 
a forerunner of more recent – ‘naturalistic’ – conceptions of the scientific realistic approach 
(see in this connection, for example, Boyd 1982 & 1983 and Salmon 1984). This is not to say 
that Reichenbach’s probabilistic argument is beyond debate (for a critical discussion, see Psil-
los 2011a). But it seems to be clear that by focusing on the concept of probability Reichen-
bach paved the way for mid- and late twentieth-century articulations of the scientific realist 
agenda.  
However, as already indicated, the probabilistic argument cannot be further discussed in 
this paper. Rather, I wish to take a closer look at Herbert Feigl’s approach toward the realism 
issue, as he outlined it in his essay “Existential Hypotheses: Realistic versus Phenomenalistic 
Interpretations” (first published in 1950). It is no exaggeration to state that this essay was 
Feigl’s most important contribution to the debate over realism. In its essence, it contained a 
(language-based) ‘pragmatic argument’ which must be strictly distinguished from Reichen-
bach’s probabilistic argument.  
To begin with, like Reichenbach, Feigl intended to provide us with an affirmative (or 
constructive) treatment of the realist idea. Furthermore, Feigl, again like Reichenbach, based 
his argumentation on semantics. By taking semantics seriously, he maintained, “[t]he glib and 
easy dismissal of the issue as a pseudo-problem will no longer do” (Feigl 1950a, p. 36). Ac-
cordingly, what Feigl basically intended was, as he claimed, a “rapprochement” between a 
“critical phenomenalism (or operationism),” on the one hand, and a “critical (or empirical) 
scientific realism,” on the other (ibid., p. 41). Feigl called the resulting position “Semantic 
Realism” (ibid., p. 50) and demarcated it from what he called “Probabilistic Realism” (ibid., 
p. 52). The latter point of view was, as Feigl explicitly remarked, the one defended, among 
others, by Reichenbach (see ibid., p. 45). As already pointed out, Feigl refused Reichenbach’s 
frequentist interpretation of probability. More generally, he repudiated the entire probabilistic 
approach. According to Feigl, scientific realism with its “existential hypotheses” concerning 
theoretical entities could not be justified inductively. Quite the other way round: 
 
Instead of justifying the surplus meaning of existential hypotheses and hypothetical con-
structs (Reichenbach’s “illata”) by means of inductive probability, I suggest that we justify 
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the conceptual frame of the realistic language by its entailed consequence; viz. by showing 
that only within such a frame it makes sense to assign probabilities to existential hypotheses. 
(ibid., p. 54) 
 
Thus, in Feigl’s view, we first have to establish the realist framework and we then are in a 
position to raise questions about the probability of specific existential hypotheses concerning 
theoretical entities. Or, as he argued at another place: 
 
The customary probabilistic realism in trying to justify “transcendent” hypotheses on the ba-
sis of experimental findings has put the cart before the horse. Only after the introduction of 
the realistic frame can we legitimately argue inductively either from the theory to the out-
come of as yet unperformed experiments; or vice versa from the results of experiments to 
specific postulates of the theory. (Feigl 1950b, p. 195)  
 
Thus, according to Feigl, it is “the presupposed introduction of the realistic frame, i.e. the 
semantic-realistic interpretation of the theory” which “furnishes the very possibility of a theo-
ry that is inductively fruitful” (ibid.). 
But how, then, can the adoption of the realist framework itself be motivated? As Psillos 
has correctly observed, answering this question from the perspective of Feigl “is, ultimately, a 
matter of convention” (Psillos 2011b, p. 308). That is, for Feigl, realism is dependent on a 
foregoing conventionalist decision. Consequently, realism cannot be justified naturalistically, 
but only in a quasi-transcendental manner. By ‘quasi-transcendental’ I mean the assumption 
that we cannot directly refer to theoretical (unobservable) entities but that we first have to 
reflect on the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of drawing inductive-probabilistic inferences. As 
in the case of Feigl, this assumption is only quasi-transcendental because it is not related to 
(truth-conducive) statements but only to (action- and decision-relevant) conventions and thus 
rather ‘regulative’ than ‘constitutive’ in the original Kantian sense. As such, it serves as the 
basis of an essentially pragmatic argument. Or, in Feigl’s own words: 
 
The introduction of new basic and irreducible concepts (as, for example, in electromagnetics 
during the last century) may be reconstructed as an expansion of the empirical language. Only 
after our language has thus been enriched, can we significantly assign probabilities (degrees 
of confirmation) to specific predictive or explanatory hypotheses. The step of expansion of 
language cannot itself be justified on the grounds of probability, except perhaps in the sophis-
ticated pragmatic sense of the question: Will this expansion be methodologically fruitful? 




After all, it is the insight in the “need for definitional or conventional stipulation” (ibid., p. 54) 
by which, according to Feigl, the realist enterprise is motivated in the first place. The ‘condi-
tion of the possibility’ of the realist program lies outside the reach of the realist program itself. 
Or as Psillos has aptly put it, for Feigl, there is “no ultimate argument for the adoption of the 
realist framework” (Psillos 2011b, p. 303). Ontic questions are pragmatic “framework-
questions” (ibid.), and framework-questions must be decided by convention before any specif-
ic existential hypothesis concerning theoretical entities can be evaluated.       
The problematic aspects of this quasi-transcendental, convention-based, justification of 
scientific realism have been discussed elsewhere (see Neuber 2011 & 2014). To put it in a 
nutshell, Feigl’s approach seems not to go beyond the later Carnap’s ontological ‘neutralism’ 
(see Carnap 1956 [1950]). On the other hand, it must be seen that Feigl’s contribution formed 
an autonomous variety of ‘realistic claims in logical empiricism.’ Especially his contention 
that theoretical terms have “factual reference” (Feigl 1950a, p. 48) distinguished his ‘semantic 
realism’ as a remarkable deviation from early, verificationist, accounts of logical empiricism. 
However, as Carl Gustav Hempel (1950, pp. 172-73) pointed out in his critique of Feigl’s 
view, the very conception of factual reference fell victim to other restrictions within the logi-
cal empiricist agenda. After all, Feigl’s semantic realism boiled down to the charge that theo-
retical statements be “indirectly confirmable” (Feigl 1950a, p. 57). Their ‘factuality’ was tied 
to directly confirmable observation statements, the systematic function of which, Feigl main-
tained, provided “a maximum of nomological coherence by means of a minimum of hypothet-
ical construction” (ibid.). No doubt that an instrumentalist (or operationist) would have em-
braced this point of view, all the more since Feigl repeatedly claimed that the realist frame 
itself was nothing but a “basic convention” (ibid.) that could be “justified only instrumental-
ly” (Feigl 1950b, p. 195). It was for this reason that Hempel did, as he concluded, “not feel 
convinced that reliance on the problematic concept of the factual referents of theoretical con-
structs is necessary or even helpful in an attempt to achieve a comprehensive and coherent 
theoretical account of scientific method and scientific knowledge” (Hempel 1950, p. 173). In 
fact, also at a larger scale Feigl’s plea for scientific realism did not come to fruition. The 
‘pragmatic argument’ he offered could hardly convince the philosophy of science community 
(for the details of this diagnosis, see Neuber 2011; for a recent vindication of Feigl’s pragmat-
ic argument, see Psillos 2011b).             
Hempel’s critique of Feigl’s interpretation of the status of theoretical concepts formed the 
point of departure for a third variety of ‘realistic claims in logical empiricism.’ In his guiding 
paper “The Theoretician’s Dilemma: A Study in the Logic of Theory Construction,” first pub-
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lished in 1958, Hempel focused on the purpose of scientific theory construction. As he saw it, 
the principle aim of building theories was “systematization.” Conceiving of theories as axio-
matized systems (see Hempel 1958, p. 46), Hempel confronted the reader with the following – 
straightforwardly anti-realist – line of reasoning: 
 
If the terms and principles of a theory serve their purpose they are unnecessary, as just point-
ed out, and if they don’t serve their purpose they are surely unnecessary. But given any theo-
ry, its terms and principles either serve their purpose or they don’t. Hence, the terms and 
principles of any theory are unnecessary. (ibid., pp. 49-50) 
 
This argument is called by Hempel the theoretician’s dilemma (ibid., p. 50). However, it must 
be said that the dilemma’s second horn is trivial, while the first horn of the dilemma is in need 
of comment. It seems to represent the view of the ‘sophisticated’ anti-realist. Thus, it could be 
agreed upon that theoretical concepts and statements serve their purpose if they establish no-
mological connections among observable phenomena. But then, the sophisticated anti-realist 
could argue, theoretical concepts and statements can be dispensed with since they are replace-
able by concepts and statements that directly refer to the realm of observable phenomena. 
Logical techniques such as Craig’s theorem or the Ramsey-sentence apparently substantiate 
this abstract claim (see ibid., Sect. 9). 
 It is not very difficult to see that Feigl’s account of scientific realism is suspiciously close 
to the sophisticated anti-realist’s conception. No wonder, then, that Hempel rejected Feigl’s 
point of view as unconvincing. But what was his alternative? As Hempel comprehensively 
points out in “The Theoretician’s Dilemma,” one must distinguish between two types of sys-
tematization: deductive and inductive systematization. While in the context of deductive sys-
tematization theoretical terms are dispensable, they are indispensable for the purposes of in-
ductive systematization. According to Hempel, theories are partially interpreted systems, i.e., 
systems of concepts and statements that cannot be entirely reduced to the observational evi-
dence base. He therefore is convinced that “the Ramsey-sentence associated with an interpret-
ed theory T’ avoids reference to hypothetical entities only in letter – replacing Latin constants 
by Greek variables – rather than in spirit” (ibid., p. 81). In fact, Hempel maintains, “Ramsey-
sentences provide no satisfactory way of avoiding theoretical concepts” (ibid.). This comes as 
no surprise, since it is theoretical concepts that are needed for the sake of inductive systemati-
zation. However, as Hempel argues in direct contradistinction to Feigl, “semantics does not 
enable us to decide whether the theoretical terms in a given system T’ do, or do not, have se-
mantical, factual, or ontological reference” (ibid., p. 82: my emphasis). From a purely seman-
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tic point of view, the referent of any term can be specified, given that our metalanguage is rich 
enough. Therefore, Hempel concludes, “we have to look elsewhere for criteria of significance 
for theoretical terms and sentences” (ibid.)     
 What are these criteria? According to Hempel, we just have to know the rules by which 
sentences of the basic observational vocabulary, VB, are inferred from sentences containing 
theoretical terms. This exactly is provided by the procedure of partial interpretation, and we 
thereby at the same time obtain a workable conception of how inductive relations are estab-
lished among observable phenomena Thus, given a theoretical hypothesis HT entails observa-
tional consequences OC1, OC2, …, OCn, we can inductively infer that HT is true. Further, giv-
en that HT entails a new confirmable prediction OCn+1, we are obviously entitled to conclude 
that HT is indispensable because the derivation of OCn+1 rests – in an essential way – on the 
assumption that the inductively obtained hypothesis HT is true. This is Hempel’s way out of 
the theoretician’s dilemma. He claims to have convincingly shown that it starts with a false 
premise, namely that theoretical terms and sentences, if they serve their purpose, are unneces-
sary (see ibid., p. 87). Accordingly, for Hempel, a realist interpretation of science is justified. 
Theoretical systems can, on that basis, be regarded as significant, and the factual reference of 
theoretical terms can be captured by the following deflationist account of truth: “To assert 
that the terms of a given theory have factual reference, that the entities they purport to refer to 
actually exist, is tantamount to asserting that what the theory tells us is true; and this in turn is 
tantamount to asserting the theory.” (ibid., p. 84) Thus, when we assert that the elementary 
particles of contemporary physical theory exist, we assert the truth of the (partially interpret-
ed) physical theory of elementary particles. Moreover, Hempel maintains that on his account 
the basic tenets of empiricist philosophy can be kept up. In particular, he is eager to tie the 
theoretical vocabulary to the basic observational vocabulary. The factual reference of theoret-
ical terms is, in Hempel’s view, straightforwardly implied by the theory’s being true, and the 
theory’s being true can be determined by “an empirical investigation of its VB-consequences” 
(ibid., p. 85)     
It is hard to see why Hempel’s approach should mark a step beyond the point of view de-
fended by Feigl. To be sure, the insight in the indispensability of theoretical terms is a neces-
sary condition for holding a realist position in the philosophy of science. But the ‘indispensa-
bility argument’ as such is by no means sufficient. Scientific anti-realists could concede the 
indispensability of theoretical terms but at the same time deny their factual reference. They 
could, in other words, admit that theoretical terms are necessarily needed for the sake of in-
ductive systematization, but (without becoming bogged down in contradictions) contend that 
11 
 
their function is exhausted by this purely systematizing role. That is to say, what is missing in 
Hempel’s approach is an independent argument for the claim that theoretical terms factually 
refer to (independently existing) theoretical entities. Without such an additional argument, 
Hempel’s conception remains open for non-realist reformulations in the spirit of the later Car-
nap’s ‘external/internal questions’-point of view (for a fuller discussion of this see Salmon 
1999b, pp. 336-37 and Salmon 2005, pp. 26-28).       
 
4  The Invariantist Alternative 
By making the factual reference of theoretical terms derivative from theoretical truth, Hempel 
remains, despite his own contention, within the realm of semantics and thereby within the 
interpretation of the realism issue as a problem of language. Like Feigl, he finally ends up 
with a severe empiricist restriction: theoretical truths – and with them theoretical terms – must 
be essentially tied to the foundation of observational evidence. But why then is this argument 
operating along realist lines? Would it not suffice to focus on the observational (experimental) 
adequacy of scientific theories? Or, as Ernest Nagel put it in his critique of Feigl’s “Existen-
tial Hypotheses:”     
 
[W]hether one assumes existential hypotheses to be translatable into the language of direct 
observation, or construes them as elements in a complex symbolic apparatus whose function 
is to establish systematic relations between experimental data, in either case it seems quite in-
telligible to assert that a hypothesis is in agreement with a given body of evidence to some 
specified extent. (Nagel 1950, p. 181) 
 
Why, then, should logical empiricists allow for a realist reading of science at all? 
A possible answer to this question is that such a realist reading is demanded by science it-
self. In a certain sense, among the logical empiricists it was Reichenbach who, by invoking 
the concept of probability, initiated such a non-transcendental, naturalistic, approach to sci-
ence and scientific theory construction. However, the one who articulated this approach most 
potently was (at least in my opinion) Eino Kaila. According to Kaila, the realism issue is defi-
nitely not a problem of language. In his view, the problems of philosophy concern, ultimately, 
scientifically described reality rather than (the quasi-transcendental) questions of ‘language 
engineering.’ Thus, as early on as in 1930, in his Logistic Neopositivism (a critique particular-
ly of Carnap’s Aufbau), Kaila declares that “the ‘realist language’ of science is actually far 
more than a mere manner of speaking: it is the expression of the living soul of science” (Kaila 
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[1930] 1979, p. 4). To be sure, this could be interpreted as the articulation of (a certain variant 
of) ‘bad metaphysics.’ However, what Kaila intends to clarify is that a mere reflection on the 
language of science is not enough in order to account for the empirical content of scientific 
theories. In other words, according to Kaila it is impossible – or, better, irresponsible – to ig-
nore the ‘material mode of speaking’ (inhaltliche Redeweise) and to restrict philosophical 
analysis to the ‘formal mode of speaking’ (formale Redeweise). This – essentially Carnapian – 
strategy would, in Kaila’s view, be not empiricist at all. It would rather amount to an empiri-
cally empty (almost ‘scholastic’) formalism. On the other hand, Kaila goes not so far as to 
embrace the idiom of speculative metaphysics. As he stresses in his recently translated Inhi-
millinen tieto (published first in 1939), “the assumption that ‘behind’ experience there is an-
other, intellectually more perfect world” (Kaila [1939] 2014, p. 29) is empirically not con-
firmed and hopelessly “imprecise” (ibid.). Thus it is empirical scientific realism rather than 
metaphysical realism by which the Kailaian point of view is driven. Or, as Niiniluoto has once 
put it: 
 
Kaila had high respect for the exact philosophical method of the Vienna Circle. Therefore, he 
strived for a careful formulation of the realism issue, one that would satisfy the critical de-
mands of the new logical empiricism. But it was clear that Kaila – the philosopher of nature 
who wanted to solve the riddle of reality – could not follow the “linguistic turn” of Analytical 
Philosophy: for him the deepest problems of philosophy concern reality rather than language. 
(Niiniluoto 1992, p. 103) 
    
Kaila, who stood in close contact both to Reichenbach and to the members of the Vienna 
Circle (see Manninen 2012), grounded his approach to science on two major principles: the 
principle of testability (see esp. Kaila [1936] 1979, pp. 62-63) and the principle of invariance 
(see esp. Kaila [1941] 1979, pp. 149-162). While he characterized the first principle as the 
“principle of logical empiricism” ([1936] 1979, p. 62), the second principle served, as it were, 
as his criterion of reality. Accordingly, Kaila’s point of view should be conceived of as a 
fourth variety of ‘realistic claims in logical empiricism.’ As such, it can be best characterized 
as being based on an ‘invariantist’ – directly science-related (and thus not metaphysically mo-
tivated) – argument. Hence it is, I claim, appropriate (and justified) to see in Kaila the most 
explicit proponent of a realistically inspired variant of logical empiricism. 
In order to substantiate this contention, it is advisable to first have a short glimpse at 
Kaila’s principle of testability. As he points out in his monograph On the Concept of Reality 
in Physical Science: Second Contribution to Logical Empiricism, first published in 1941, it is 
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“measurement statements” by which the theoretical hypotheses of physics are empirically 
tested. Kaila writes: 
 
[T]he principle of physical testability, which defines empirical statements as ‘physical’, states 
that the real content of any physical statement […] consists in the set of measurement state-
ments which are derivable from the statement (in connection with given data). A statement 
which does not have any such real content is by definition not a physical statement. This 
principle is implied by the requirement that the singular empirical statements of physics (the 
basic statements) be exclusively measurement statements. (Kaila [1941] 1979, p. 184) 
 
Had Kaila in earlier writings demanded that theoretical statements be translatable into the 
language of observation (see Niiniluoto 2012, pp. 79-80), he now felt content with their being 
testable by executing measurements: “[T]he assumption of translatability is not necessary 
[…]; testability would suffice” (Kaila [1941] 1979, p. 143). Moreover, Kaila clearly saw the 
need for idealization in scientific theory construction and therefore contended that “no theory 
is decidable, verifiable or falsifiable, in the strict sense; there is decidability only in a certain 
‘relaxed’ or ‘weakened’ sense; this, however, is testability” (ibid., p. 162).  
Kaila’s second principle, the principle of invariance, may be portrayed as the very core of 
his entire philosophical conception (see von Wright 1992, pp. 80-81). In a nutshell, this prin-
ciple implies that whenever we talk about (both scientific and everyday) reality, we refer to 
‘invariances.’ “There is knowledge only,” Kaila maintains, “when some similarity, sameness, 
uniformity, analogy, in brief, some ‘invariance’ is found and given a name. In knowledge, we 
are always concerned with ‘invariances’ alone” (Kaila [1941] 1979, p. 131). As Kaila further 
points out, the discovery of invariances always goes along with the establishment of a certain 
structural identity (or isomorphism). In Kaila’s own words: 
 
[I]f one succeeds, e.g., in giving for some domain an account which is in some sense ‘uni-
fied’, then we have the discovery of an ‘invariance’; some characteristic or other of higher or 
lover conceptual level will then have been shown to be invariant with respect to a permuta-
tion of the places of the domain. Likewise, e.g., in any formal analogy, structural identity, 
isomorphism between two different domains, there is also some logically or mathematically 
definable ‘structure’, e.g., an equation, that is invariant with respect to the interchange of the-
se domains. (ibid, p. 151) 
 
All of this amounts to a ‘structural realist’ account of science and scientific theory construc-
tion. According to Kaila, it is invariant structures that are captured and described by our best 
corroborated theories of physical reality. One can even go as far as to say that, for Kaila, 
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physical reality is nothing but invariant structures. “The ‘real’,” Kaila declares, “is what is in 
some respect (relatively) invariant” (ibid., p. 185). It is relatively invariant because, in Kaila’s 
view, we have, according to the respective degree of invariance, different layers of reality. 
Thus Kaila provides us with some sort of ontological hierarchy which extends from perceptu-
al reality to (thing-like) everyday reality and eventually to what is called by him ‘physico-
scientific reality.’ Or, in his own words:    
 
The physical reality of everyday is a system of invariances of experience, in which a large 
part of the phenomena is adjudged as ‘illusion’ and eliminated. Physico-scientific reality is 
the system of higher invariances of everyday reality, in which again a large part of the latter 
reality is adjudged as ‘illusion’ and eliminated. […] [P]hysico-scientific reality, which is rep-
resented by the system of real-descriptions, is in logical respects the highest reality we can at-
tain. (ibid.) 
 
So much should have become clear by now: Kaila’s invariantism delivers an independent, 
non-linguistic, argument for a scientifically realist articulation of the logical empiricist pro-
gram. According to him, invariance is not inherent in our language but an immanent feature of 
physical reality (of which our language systems are a part of). Conceived that way, Kaila’s 
invariantist alternative implies that “physical and scientific objects are objective, independent 
of us and our perceptions” (Niiniluoto 1992, p. 113). Yet this does not imply that Kaila fell 
back into the idiom of speculative metaphysics. To be sure, the ‘best’ invariances we have in 
science (such as Noether’s theorem in classical mathematical physics, comparable invariant 
theorems in quantum mechanics, etc.) are formulated in mathematical languages (governed 
by certain logical and non-logical rules). Therefore Kaila’s realistic, non-linguistic, interpreta-
tion of the invariance concept might appear to be too far-reaching in terms of ‘ontological 
commitment’ (at least from an empiricist point of view). However, in order to account for the 
empirical content of the invariance concept (and its various applications) the realistic interpre-
tation is the only plausible way to go, since invariances are nothing that can be directly ob-
served. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that by formulating principles of invariance 
something about empirical reality is intended to be conveyed. In short, Kaila’s invariantist 
argument is sound, provided we accept its status as an answer to the question of how the 
mathematized language of theoretical physics can be empirically interpreted.    
However, it still remains to be shown how the principle of testability and the principle of 
invariance are tied to each other. Concerns of space prevent an extended discussion of this 
point in this investigation, but suffice it to note that Kaila’s theory of measurement is destined 
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to achieve the desired solution. According to this (thoroughly anti-conventionalist) theory, it 
is metrical relations that are subject of the application of the principle of testability. Metrical 
relations, in turn, are the building blocks of Kaila’s invariantist ontology. They are what, in 
the first place, render measurement possible and, thus, are to be seen as “elementary facts 
which must be present independently of measurement” (Kaila [1941] 1979, p. 200; my em-
phasis). Thus according to Kaila, the (physically) real is what can be measured, and what can 
be measured are invariant systems of relations, viz. structures. Consequently, his invariantist 
approach comes very close to structural realism. The following passage from his book on hu-
man knowledge might serve to corroborate this claim: 
 
Kant argued that knowledge pertains to appearances only and not to ‘things-in-themselves’. 
And yet he clearly thought that there is an isomorphic relation between appearances and 
things-in-themselves. That is to say, appearances are representations of things-in-themselves; 
they share a structure, although, according to Kant, that structure is realized in material that is 
completely different in the two cases. 
 We can see therefore that it is wrong to say that we know nothing of things-in-
themselves: after all, we do know their structure. And if the extreme view turned out to be 
correct that our knowledge is in the last analysis just a matter of mere representation, we 
would have to say that we know just as much about things-in-themselves as we do about ap-
pearances. (Kaila [1939] 2014, p. 14) 
 
Interestingly enough, in the footnote pertaining to this passage Kaila refers the reader to Ber-
trand Russell’s (structuralist) Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy from 1919 (see, in this 
connection, especially Russell 1919, p. 61). At any rate, for Kaila, the structure of Kantian 
things-in-themselves is knowable because invariant structures are what can be measured.  
 
 5  Concluding Remarks 
By way of conclusion, it is instructive to note that the four described varieties of realistic 
claims in logical empiricism evolved from a rather defensive ‘empirical realist’ account of 
science and nature (Carnap and Schlick) to a significantly more offensive articulation of real-
istic intuitions within the realm of semantics. Reichenbach’s probabilistic, Feigl’s pragmatic 
and Hempel’s indispensability argument have to be seen against this background. Yet, neither 
of these arguments is really persuasive. The invariantist argument delivered by Kaila, on the 
other hand, is more promising. The finally effected fusion of logical empiricist (principle of 
testability) and structural realist (principle of invariance) components has the potential to 
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stake out a middle path between so-called ‘epistemic’ structural realism and so-called ‘ontic’ 
structural realism (for the details of this distinction, see Ladyman 1998). The principle impli-
cations of the resulting variant of a ‘metrological’ structural realism have been indicated 
elsewhere (see Neuber 2012, esp. pp. 374-379); its full systematic exploitation, though, re-
mains the subject of future enquiry. However, it has hopefully become clear in the present 
paper that Kaila’s ‘invariantist alternative’ must be appreciated as a highly original contribu-
tion to the logical empiricist movement and therefore deserves more attention than it has re-
ceived so far.  
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